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STRUCTURAL REVIEW, PSEUDO-SECOND-LOOK DECISION




I am very grateful to Professor Tushnet for his probing response
to my treatment of structural review.' His comments are valuable
under the principle of res ipsa loquitur, for Professor Tushnet long
has been a leading observer of the Court's structural work.2 I am
especially grateful for Professor Tushnet's encouraging words about
my project and its goals.' We share, it seems, a strong conviction
that academic lawyers, political scientists, and ultimately, the
courts need to give more systematic attention to structural (or what
he would call subconstitutional) review.'
Professor Tushnet's own essay focuses on two key thoughts. First,
he worries that the Justices might manipulate structural review to
* The author thanks Milner Ball, Randy Beck, Walter Hellerstein, and James C. Smith
for promptly delivered comments on a draft of this Essay.
1. See Mark Tushnet, Subconstitutional Law: Supplement, Sham, or Substitute?, 42
WM. & MARYL. REV. 1871 (2001).
2. See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw 201-13 (1988); Mark V. Tushnet, Legal Realism, Structural Review,
and Prophesy, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 809 (1983).
3. See Dan T. Coenen,A Constitution ofCollaboration Protecting Fundamental Values
with Second-Look Rules ofInterbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1575 (2001).
4. The importance ofstructuralreviewwas recentlyhighlightedbythe Supreme Court's
decision in Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 121 S. Ct. 675
(2001). There the Court applied a federalism-based clear-statement rule and a non-
delegation-related constitutional "who" rule to reject an agency's action that represented "a
significant impingement on the States' traditional and primary power over land and water
use." Id. at 684. But see id. at 693 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that regulation did not
involve "land use" but "environmental regulation"). For a useful account and evaluation of
the recent rise in the Supreme Courts use of proper-findings-and-study rules, see A.
Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court's
New "On the Record"Review ofFederal Statutes, 86 CORNELLL. REV. 328 (2001). See also id.
at 330-32 nn. 10-11 (collecting other secondary authorities).
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obtain desired substantive outcomes while avoiding"the sting of the
charge that they are foreclosing legislative choice."5 Second, he
considers the impact of structural doctrines on the Court's more
traditional substantive work, including by raising the possibility
that their now-pervasive use may remove the need for substantive
judicial review altogether.'
Limitations of time and space foreclose a full reply to these
provocative observations. In this Essay, however, I will pause to
note some reasons why the "sham decision" critique of structural
review is, for me, unpersuasive. I also will offer a few comments on
the proper relationship between structural and substantive review.
I note, in particular, that an endorsement of "activist" structural
review need not lead to a "nonactivist" approach to substantive
review, far less its total abandonment. I also suggest that a vigor-
ous embrace of structural rules may well lead to more, rather than
less, overall judicial protection of fundamental rights.
I. STRUCTURAL REVIEW AS A SHAM
Professor Tushnet poses the question whether the true purpose
of structural review is to facilitate strategic behavior by judges bent
on writing their own philosophies into law. On this view, as
Professor Tushnet has written elsewhere, "[c0lever judges ...
invoke structural review when they predict that the-legislature will
be unable to enact legislation that contravenes the judges' personal
preferences."7 They thus "rig' a desired substantive outcome." They
pretend to be exercising judicial restraint by declaring that the
legislature may reinstate an invalidated law, all the while knowing
that, as a practical matter, it cannot.9
5. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1872.
6. See id. at 1876-79.
7. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 211.
8. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERiCAN CONSTITUTONAL LAw § 17-3, at 1686 (2d ed. 1988)
(footnote omitted).
9. I recognize that this description does not focus on those situations in which a
substantive invalidation is not a realistic option. In such circumstances, judges interested
only in substantive outcomes may-because they have no other practical choice-issue a
structural invalidation and then just hope for the best. I am not sure I would characterize
this use of structural review as a "sham." I also am doubtful that situations commonly arise
in which the Court cannot issue a substantive invalidation if it genuinely wishes to obtain
1882 [Vol. 42:1881
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Why do I doubt that judges often use structural review as a
subterfuge for de facto substantive review? There can be no doubt
that judicial motivation-like any form of human motivation-is
complex. My own sense of things suggests, however, that judges
usually state real reasons for real decisions when they set forth
their reasons in written opinions.' It is difficult to prove this
proposition. It seems to me, however, that it corresponds with what
we expect of ordinary citizens when they make important formal
and public pronouncements. Why should we expect anything less of
judicial authorities who are distinctively steeped by training and
experience in the importance of truth, precision, and principle?1
Let us assume, however, that judges (or at least many of them)
have no qualms about manipulating doctrine any way they can to
etch their own substantive preferences into law. In my view, if one
aims to achieve substantive outcomes by way of judicial action,
there are strong practical and tactical reasons not to rely on
structural rules.
The key problem is that the technique "lacks reliability."' From
a sham-decision-making perspective, for example, the Court
apparently felt it had done enough to lay the death penalty to rest
a substantive result. For these reasons, I believe the following discussion deals with the
principal dangers presented by potential sham uses of structural review.
10. My view, which rests in significant part on my experience as ajudicial clerk, is not
unique. See, e.g., ROBERT S. SUMMERs & ROBERT A. HniLm , CONTRACT AND RELATED
OBLIGATION A-s (3d ed. 1997) (noting that "[wie believe nearly all judges try to give their
'real' reasons when writing opinions").
11. Professor Tushnet points to the Morgentaler case as possibly involving strategic use
of structural review. See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1873-74. 1 lack a detailed familiarity with
the case. Based on Professor Tushnets description of it, however, the Canadian court seems
to have stood on solid ground in issuing a structurallyminded invalidation. Put another way,
if the political branches' provision for committee review of the abortion decision was in
actuality a dysfunctional and empty gesture, there is reason to believe their work was not
carefully done at the outset or that it proceeded from faulty factual assumptions or both. In
just such a case, given the significant liberty interest at stake, ajudicial mandate to take a
second look seems quite reasonable. Nor does the legislature's failure to reach a new
consensus upon reconsideration of the matter prove that the Court was overreaching.
Professor Tushnet notes two reasons why this is so: (1) "the political terrain may have
changed," and (2) the legislature may have reassessed its position precisely because of "new
information" supplied to it by the judiciary, including with regard to the important
constitutional interests at stake. Id. at 1874. I consider these same dynamics (albeit in
another context) in my article. See Coenen, supra note 3, at 1709-21.
12. See TRIBE, supra note 8, at 1686.
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when it decided Furman v. Georgia."3 The Court also apparentlyfelt
it had done enough to ensure that legal aliens could get federal civil
service jobs when it decided Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong.' And the
Court apparently felt it had done enough to safeguard states from
damages actions under the Rehabilitation Act when it decided
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon.5 In all these instances,
however, the law supposedly scuttled by way of a strategic
structural invalidation made a roaring comeback in identical or
near-identical form.16 In each of these cases, then, the Court's
ostensible purpose failed, for the remand to political authorities
produced precisely the substantive result the Court supposedly had
sought to foreclose. 7
13. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
14. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
15. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
16. For later developments concerning Furman, see Coenan, supra note 3, at 1716 &
n.572, and Mow Sun Wong, see id. at 1776 & n.850. For later developments concerning
Atascadero, seeLane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187,200 (1996) (noting "the care withwhich Congress
responded to our decision in Atascadero by crafting an unambiguous waiver of the States'
Eleventh Amendment immunity" in amendments to the Rehabilitation Act). These three
cases, of course, merely exemplify a much broader universe of instances in which judicial
second-look interventions led to reinstatement of a prior action taken by the political
branches. See, e.g., Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Mauney, 183 F.3d 816,822 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting
that Congress responded to the Court's clarity-based decision inDellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S.
223 (1989), by clearly abrogating state sovereign immunity under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act).
17. The pointis strengthened by identifying carefully what structural rules are. Professor
Tushnet describes them as embodying the following judicial instruction to lawmaking
authorities: "You tried to accomplish goal X through means A. But, you can't do that....
Rather, you can accomplish goal X, but only by using means B or C." Tushnet, supra note 1,
at 1872. This description is helpful, particularly if one conceives structural rules to include
what I call quasi-structural means-centered proper-fit rules. See Coenen, supra note 3, at
1823-28. The "pure" structural rules onwhich my article focuses, however, might be captured
more accurately with this slightly refined shorthand instruction to political decision makers:
"You tried to accomplish goal X through means A. But you can't do that unless you do
something more to show you really thought about and seriously committed yourself to both
goalX and means A. Ifyou do that something more, then you can accomplish goal Xthrough
means A (or a means so similar to means A that we would think of it as means A', rather
than as means B or C)." Maybe this reformulation is too nitpicky. It makes the point,
however, thatthe particular rules we are discussing ordinarily permit lawmakers to reinstall
exactly the same rule they meant to or did install in the first place. And this point cuts
against the argument that judges can tactically utilize structural rulings to frustrate pursuit
of "goal X" altogether. After all, while it may be legislatively difficult to pursue goal X not
with means A, but with means B or C, in any true remand-to-the-legislature situation, the
legislature by definition already has signaled a willingness to utilize means A.
1884
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Another reason to doubt the reliability-and thus the common
use-of substance-seeking structural invalidations arises out of the
passage of time. It is difficult enough for a judge to predict what a
sitting legislature will do with a law invalidated on structural
grounds. But it will require true powers of prophesy to project what
a very differently constituted legislative body will do two, ten, or
twenty years down the road. Put another way, even if one can
confidently conclude that today's legislature will not reinstate a law
invalidated in a structural ruling, that fact does not mean
tomorrow's legislature will have the same disinclination. Any judge
interested in achieving a substantive end beyond the short term is
therefore unlikely to use a structural approach.
One possible rejoinder to these observations is that manipulative
judges who unsuccessfully deploy structural rules for substantive
ends have a second line of defense. On this view, following res-
toration of a rule initially jettisoned on structural grounds, the
court can simply declare the now-restored rule invalid in a
conclusive ruling based on substantive doctrine. Professor Tushnet
notes, for example, that the Supreme Court first invoked clear-
statement rules when it set out to undermine would-be con-
gressional abrogations of Eleventh Amendment immunities. When
Congress responded by legislating abrogations with clarity, he says,
"[tihe Court then imposed the substantive limits anyway." 8
There are subplots to this story, however, that highlight the risks
inherent in any judicial reliance on the fallback of a substantive
invalidation. First, inits initial brushwith the substantive question
whether Congress could legislate clear abrogations, the Court held
that such abrogations in fact were effective under the commerce
power. 9 To be sure, the Court later overturned that ruling with its
decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.20 But the Court
that took this action was-because of the passage of time-a very
different Court from the one that had engineered the Court's
original structural clarity-based "invalidations.""' In addition, the
18. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1876.
19. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
20. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
21. During the 11 years that passed between Atascadero and Seminole Tribe, Chief
Justice Rehnquist succeeded Chief Justice Burger, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter,
20011 1885
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substantive ruling in Seminole Tribe came by way of a five-four
vote, accompanied by a pair of particularly strident and com-
prehensive dissents.' This fact reveals that a further passage of
time may yet undo the current Court's Seminole Tribe approach.
The point is that Justices-who do not control the timing of
legislative action, the nature of the cases brought before them, or
the selection of future judicial colleagues--cannot count on readily
correcting errors in their predictions that structural rulings will
have a permanent debilitating effect. If uncertainty marks judicial
predictions about political responses to structural rulings, even
greater uncertainty lurks in predictions about the likely availability
of later judicial opportunities to "fix" unsuccessful strategic uses of
structural review.
There is another reason to doubt that the Justices often employ
structural rules as a subterfuge for pursuing substantive goals.
The reason is that there are many other legitimate justifications
for putting these rules to work. I already have identified ten
possible justifications," and Professor Tushnet's discussion of
"policy space""' suggests another argument for structural rules
(as well as their doctrinal first-cousins, quasi-structural "means-
centered proper-fit rules").2"
Drawing on the work of political scientists, Professor Tushnet
describes the legislative process as often involving choices among
a variety of means, each of which is "politically acceptable to the
contending forces," for pursuing a desired goal.2" If this depiction is
accurate (and I think it is), structural review often may work neatly
to advance both constitutional rights and the values of democratic
self-governance. After all, what harm can come from a structural
invalidation that pushes a legislature from a constitutionally
problematic means to a nonproblematic means located within the
same policy space? Plainly no harm arises if the troublesome means
Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined the Court; and Justices Powell, Brennan, Marshall,
White, and Blackinun retired.
22. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 76 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 100 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
23. See Coenen, supra note 3, at 1834-43.
24. See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1874-75.
25. Coenen, supra note 3, at 1823-28.
26. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1875.
1886 [Vol. 42:1881
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won out in the first legislative go-round solely because of "agenda
control by one or another actor, the press of time ... and the like."7
It would go too far to say the "sham" argument against structural
review is itself a sham. On balance, however, it seems to me to
carry little persuasive force.
11. STRUCTURAL REVIEW AS A SUBSTITUTE
In the latter part of his essay, Professor Tushnet broaches a
question of great importance: What is the proper relationship
between structural and substantive review? Professor Tushnet
also offers one possible answer, by advancing what we might call
the "total-displacement thesis." As he puts it: "Suppose that courts
sincerely deploy these subconstitutional doctrines, structuring
decision making by the political branches in a way that ensures
reasonably full consideration of constitutionally sensitive issues.
Why should courts play any other role?"'
The idea of wholly abandoning "judicial review in the classic
mode"29 might seem shocking if it came from another observer. But
Professor Tushnet comes to the task having already developed a
sophisticated argument in support of the plausibility of this very
result.30 That argument, however, does not center on-and indeed
treats only briefly-the subject of structural decision making.3 ' In
his essay, Professor Tushnet develops the new point that the
pervasiveness of democracy-aiding structural rules may bolster
(or even independently establish) the case for abandoning tra-
ditional judicial review. As he explains: "It could be that the sub-
constitutional doctrines, properly deployed, reduce the number and
significance of the political branches' [constitutional] errors to the
point where they are less important than the errors the courts
commit."3 2
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1876-77.
29. Id. at 1872.
30. See MARKTusHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE CouRTS (1999).
31. To be sure, Professor Tushnet's book does not overlook structural rules altogether.
See, e.g., id. at 124,126,163-64. Buthis book, unlike his essay, focuses on matters other than
structural rules.
32. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1877.
2001] 1887
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Perhaps some day I will embrace the idea that substantive
constitutional review is a bad idea. For now, however, I remain a
true believer. The reasons why could spawn an article even longer
than the tract that triggered Professor Tushnet's responsive essay.
For now, I shall simply rely.-as Professor Tushnet predicted I
would-on "text, tradition, history, and precedent.""3 My only
embellishment is to invoke as well so-called representation-
reinforcement theory.34 Put simply, if a court decides to intervene
because it worries that a challenged law came from an im-
permissibly biased or antidemocratically structured legislature, it
seems unsound (at least as a rule) to remand to that legislature so
that it can act with bias or self-interest again. 5 (By the way, I
cannot claim credit for this thought. Its source lies in the earlier
writings of Professor Tushnet himself. 6)
There are other problems with the total-displacement thesis. Let
us assume that a new-age Court, moved by Professor Tushnet's
essay, chooses to do away with substantive review because it is
persuaded that structural review adequately protects constitutional
values. A difficult question would then arise: which rules are
structural and which rules are substantive in nature? Most lawyers,
for example, probably would identify Alden v. Maine3 --which
broadly protected state sovereign immunity in state, no less than
federal, courts-as setting forth a substantive rule. Close inspection
33. Id. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 943 (1992) (Blaclmun, J.,
concurring and dissenting) ("While there is much to be praised about our democracy, our
country since its founding has recognized there are certain fundamental liberties that are
not to be left to the whims of an election.").
34. See Coenen, supra note 3, at 1689-98. See generally JOHNHARTELY, DEMOCRACYAND
DIsTRUST A THEORY OF JuDIcIAL REviEw 183 (1980) (arguing that "constitutional law
appropriately exists for those situations where representative government cannot be
trusted-).
35. Cases that illustrate the problem ofbias might include the school-desegregation and
antimiscegenation cases. See Lovingv. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). Cases that illustrate problems of self-interest in the form of self-
entrenchment might include the reapportionment and poll-tax cases. See Harper v. Virginia
State Bd. of Elec., 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). For a further
discussion of Brown, see infra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
36. See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 210. For more recent comments on the defensability of
judicial restraint, even in the face of representation-reinforcement problems, see TUSEHNET,
supra note 30, at 157-60.
37. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
[Vol. 42:18811888
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reveals, however, that Alden contains elements of a constitutional
"who" rule.8 For this reason, we cannot know how courts would
characterizeAlden in a "structural rules only" world.39 This narrow
point, moreover, suggests a broader and more important one. The
persuasiveness of any argument to the effect that structural rules
can serve as an adequate "substitute" for substantive review will
depend, in the end, on the number and nature of structural rules
the Court is willing to recognize.'
Professor Tushnet's discussion of Brown v. Board of Education4"
illustrates one difficulty along these lines. Anticipating the pre-
dictable Brown-based attack on the total-displacement thesis,
Professor Tushnet asks whether "there might... be subconstitu-
tional doctrines that would have allowed the Court in Brown to
insist that imposing a policy of segregation had to be done on the
national level."' On this view, a Court limited to using structural
rules might have decided Brown by applying a sort of "dormant
Section 5" constitutional principle." In other words, just as a state
must welcome nonresident businesses into its markets," a state
would have to admit minority students to its majority schools-
unless Congress issued an "unmistakably clear" statement to the
contrary.45 I suspect that most observers who celebrate Brown will
take little comfort in this line of analysis. For this approach to have
38. See Coenen, suprd note 3, at 1803 n.924.
39. Similar uncertainties markother rules too. Forexample, wouldcourts deem evolving
standard rules, see id. at 1713-21, substantive or structural? How about strong mani-
festations of "form based" structural rules? See id. at 1640-55. And what about thoughtful-
treatment-of-the-area rules, see id. at 1727-34, orless-restrictive-alternative and otherforms
of quasi-structural means-based rules, see id. at 1805-28.
40. Interestingly, some existing structural rules might disappear altogether if
substantive judicial review is extinguished. For example, it is hard to see how the
interpretive rule favoring avoidance of substantial constitutional issues can operate if
constitutional issues cannot arise at alL See generally id at1634-35 &n.255 (discussingthe
avoidance canon).
41. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
42. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1879.
43. The phrase combines, of course, a reference to the "dormant Commerce Clause," see
Coenen, supra note 3, at 1640, and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which grants
power to Congress to enforce the substantive protections set forth in the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of Section 1.
44. See, e.g., Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980).
45. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 139 (1986) (quoting South-Central Timber Dev.,
Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 (1984)).
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outlawed school desegregation in 1954, after all, the Court first
would have had to craft a structural rule far removed from anything
in our then-existing or present-day constitutional civil rights law.
And even if the Court had applied such a rule in Brown, Congress
could have followed up by affirmatively authorizing all, many, or
some forms of racial segregation. In any event, Brown's bold and
unanimous stroke for liberty and equality would instead have taken
the form of a more tentative, watered-down procedural directive.
Professor Tushnet's discussion of Brown-and his identification
of the total-displacement thesis-could be developed (by others) into
an argument that structural decision making on balance is likely to
dilute liberty by discouraging substantive review." This result is far
from inevitable, however, because the scope of liberty (or other
constitutional values) will always depend on the precise com-
bination and nature of those structural and substantive doctrines
the Court chooses to employ. In particular, even if the Court cuts
back on substantive review in favor of structural doctrines, its
overall level of protection of individual liberty-on balance-might
increase. Rights-based structural doctrines, after all, do protect
rights. Thus, if the Court greatly energizes structural review, while
reducing the level of substantive review only modestly, there may
well be a significant net gain in the total protection of liberty. And
this calculus does not take account of Professor Tushnet's separate
point that shifting some constitutional decisions from courts to
political officers may expand liberty by stifling judicial retrench-
ment and error.47
CONCLUSION
Professor Tushnet's suggestion that structural doctrines might
serve as a surrogate for traditional substantive review calls
attention to a deeper point. The point is that structural rules and
substantive rules inevitably operate within the context of an
interlocking and dynamic relationship. It is a matter of no small
46. See Coenen, supra note 3, at 1848 & nn.1096-97 (collecting authorities).
47. See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1878-79.
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moment to ask how the Court's use of each set of rules should bear
on how it uses the other.
Perhaps, in the end, the relationship between structural and
substantive doctrines will remain unexplained by an organizing
theory. Perhaps the very "normative democratic theory" that
helps drive structural rulese supports leaving the nature of this
relationship largely undefined. Perhaps, in particular, "under-
theorizing" the proper relationship between structural and
substantive review will wisely create "space for democratic
reflection from Congress and the states" that would not exist in the
face of"broad" and"deep"judicial pronouncements on this subject. 9
At least for now, however, this undertheorizationis primarily the
product of neglect. Professor Tushnet has taken a helpful step
toward evaluating the push and pull of structural and substantive
doctrines by identifying the possibility of total displacement. For
most of us, however, the idea of a legal universe devoid of
substantive judicial review will rub too hard against ingrained, and
justifiable, notions about how courts and constitutions should
operate.5' As a result, in the real world, the Court's use of
substantive constitutional doctrine is likely to persist. And so too,
in the real world, will the fundamental question to which Professor
Tushnet wisely has drawn our attention: How should structural
review and substantive review fit together and shape one another?
48. See idL at 1878-79.
49. CAss R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MNMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 9 (1999) (noting that "minim a justices "seek to avoid broad rules and abstract
theories" (footnote omitted)); id. at x (further noting that decisional minimalism "attempts
to promote the democratic ideals of participation, deliberation, and responsiveness").
50. See id. at x (noting that even "[mlinimalist judges are entirely willing to invalidate
some laws" and "are not committed to majority rule in all contexts").
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